The Constitutional Court of Indonesia, in its judgment No 2-3
for those Indonesian applicants and found to reject the case. On the other hand the Court declared that the case was inadmissible for the three Australian citizens. The Court found that they were not entitled to submit judicial review under the same article. This decision separated the Chambers' opinion into six to three in terms of applicants' legal standing. 5
The Applicants Submissions
The Australian citizens proclaimed that article 51 (1) (a) of the Indonesian
Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court was not in compliance with the Indonesian Constitutional Court 1945. 6 They further argued that they should have standing before the Court on the basis of these eight following grounds: i) the applicable regime of human rights law in the 1945 Constitution;
ii) non-discrimination principle; iii) and the equality before the law as afforded by the 1945 Constitution; iv) the definition of constitutional loss; v) due process of law; vi) the threshold vii) the practice of other constitutional courts; viii) and the gravity of the rights and sentence.
First of all, they argued that the wording of "each person" adopted in the 1945 Constitution shall refer to human rights law regime, leaving the concept of citizenship and nationality. 7 They claimed that article 51 (1) (a) which differs on the basis of citizenship was not in accordance with the 1945 Constitution.
The 1945 Constitution provided that each person is subjected for human rights protection as long as he/she lives within Indonesia territory. This was confirmed by
Article 26 (2) of the 1945 Constitution when defining resident as both Indonesian citizens and non-Indonesians who are within Indonesia territory, regardless its citizenship or nationality.
8
Another point was raised relating to the principle of non-discrimination before the law. They made reference to article 28D (1) of the 1945 Constitution, stating that each person is entitled to be equally treated before the law without any discrimination. Consequently, the constitutional loss defined in article 51 (1) may occur to either Indonesian citizens or non-Indonesian citizens, 9 or in other words to each person regardless its citizenship or nationality as long as he/she is afforded constitutional rights under the 1945 Constitution.
10
They further recalled the applicable hierarchy in the Indonesian legal system, which placed statutes as the manifestation of the 1945 Constitution.
Subsequently, the protection of rights set forth under the statutes rooted from the 1945 Constitution shall also apply to both Indonesian and non-Indonesian citizens. There would be then inconsistency and contradiction to argue that the rights afforded by the 1945 Constitution apply exclusively to Indonesian citizens.
If it is true that the 1945 Constitution and the rights set forth therein are reserved exclusively to Indonesian citizens, then statutes, that are the manifestation of the 1945 Constitution, shall be reserved merely for its citizens and not be applicable to non-Indonesian citizens. In this sense, they (Australian citizens) simply could not be prosecuted under the concerned statute. 11 Moreover, instead of "each person", the term of "each citizen" should have been adopted in the 1945
Constitution if it is intended and applied exclusively for Indonesian citizens.
12
They also reiterated that under article 24 (1) and 24 (1) (a) of the 1945 granted to non-Indonesian citizens, when non-Indonesian citizens become the subject of a statute and when the statutes concern with the fundamental rights that inherent to each individual regardless its citizenship and nationality.
13
Providing the practice of Germany, Mongolia and Australia constitutional court which grant legal standing for non-nationals to file for judicial review before their constitutional courts, the applicants sought for similar approach to be adopted by the Court in their case. 14 Lastly, the gravity of the sentence itself was the self-evident and argued as one of the grounds for the legal standing of the applicants. The verdict of capital punishment had shown that they (Australian citizens) were having interest for such judicial review in this case. under the principle of due process of law, in this case they could resort for appeal, cassation and review before the supreme court; iii) the wording of each person and group of people with similar interest in the official explanation of this provision must be interpreted in connection with the individual Indonesian citizens, thus, the applicants were not qualified under article 51 (1). As they had no legal standing before the Constitutional Court, 20 the case was then declared inadmissible.
The Dissenting Opinions
With regards to the merit of the case on the legality of the death penalty, and non-Indonesian citizens should be also easily differentiated. For instance, inter alia, in the political rights, the rights for election and to be elected that are embodied in the Indonesian Constitution 1945 shall apply exclusively for Indonesian citizens, and certainly not for non-Indonesian citizens. The court practices would assist to differentiate between the fundamental rights entitled for Indonesian citizens and the fundamental rights for non-Indonesian citizens that are guaranteed by the Indonesian legal system and its proceedings. 33 Lastly, he emphasized that unsystematic law or its disorder tends to occur within legal system because the laws are made in different times. It is then left to the judges to interpret the laws reflecting the spirit of the constitution so that it could be implemented in logical and systematical order. Generally speaking, (legal) standing is defined as "preliminary jurisdictional requirement, formulated at a high level of generality and applied across the entire domain of law". 35 It is more jurisdictional determination rather than determination on the substance 36 as the latter will amount to trial hearing. In order to determine the ratio legis 45 or substance of an article, it can be easily identified that the substance is usually able to serve independently the article without requiring any other clauses. On the contrary, procedural cannot stand by itself in an article. When looking at the formulation of article 51 (1), one may easily find that this article comprises of substantive elements defining the applicants and its required pre-condition, and procedural elements providing list of subjected parties who are able to bring the judicial review. Without the procedural elements of the list parties, the article yet able to stand although it solely comprises with the definition of applicants and constitutional loss. If this logical formulation is affirmed, it seems then that the three dissenting judges relied on substantive part of article 51 in determining the actual question of legal standing, meanwhile the Court decision emphasized that the question of legal standing lies on the procedural matters
Inconsistency in the Chamber's Opinion
The Chamber's found the case was inadmissible for three Australian citizens on these three following grounds. First, that article 51 (1) (a) expressis verbis or has stated clearly that it is Indonesian citizens solely, in terms of citizenship, who are able to file for judicial review before the Constitutional Court. Second, the inadmissibility of non-Indonesian citizens to examine the laws does not necessarily mean that they loss their legal protections under the principle of due process of law, in this case they were granted the legal remedies of appeal, cassation and review before the supreme court. Third, that the wording of "each Government Regulations. This theory, however, has also reiterated that in practice there is no guarantee that the lower norms would be in compliance with the higher one. 55 In order to constitute such unity, it is required for 'check and balance' in legal system by means, inter alia, the judicial review. 56 Reflecting on these circumstances, it is then fundamental for the existence of judicial review in legal system, although the concept and definition of judicial review itself vary from each state to another. Nevertheless, among those different practices between states, it could be derived that judicial review may refer to the examination of the legal instruments by the court.
57
Under the Indonesian legal system, the term of judicial review refers into these two meanings, i) the examination of whether a law is in compliance with the constitution; 58 ii) and/or that the rules or legal instruments, -inferior than the law in a hierarchical system, is in accordance with the law. 59 The first falls implies that there must be specific rules of procedure to be satisfied. It appears there is nothing error with this approach. In fact, this is concrete evidence of Gustav Radbruch long standing theory of law. According to Radbruch, there are three basic principles underlying the law, namely justice, utility and certainty.
This theory is also known for its tense situation between those three main principles, called as the spannungverhältnis. 62 It states when one hold the law for its certainty, there must be lack either to justice or utility of law on the other side. The same thing when the Court adopted its expressis verbis reasoning in this case. The Court seemed to hold for the uniformity in order to keep the rules of the game to be played in the same way. Consequently, the Court might achieve certainty and consistency application of law in terms of procedural context, but leaving behind the justice and utility principle of law. It would be appropriate here to refer this as the evidence of 'overruled substance' .
Considering citizenship concept as the starting point, imply that the parties, other than Indonesian citizens, would simply have no legal standing before the Indonesian Constitutional Court. It could also be drawn that the parties of nonIndonesian citizens could not have the constitutional loss or injury under the Indonesian legal system. This is certainly a deprival of the 1945 Constitution's mandate to provide protection to each person in Indonesian territory.
Moreover, holding the second element of article 51 (1) (a) in legal standing determination would be simply superfluous. The second element, which comprises of subjected parties, could not stand as the ratio legis of article 51 (1 It is then suggested here that the ratio legis of article 51 (1) 
The Due Process of Law
The Court had determined that such inadmissibility decision does not necessarily constitute the breach of due process of law principle since the applicants were granted the legal remedies of appeal, cassation and review before the Supreme Court. 66 As a matter of fact, it was true that they were given their rights for legal remedies by means appeal and cassation by the time the constitutional judgment was delivered. This reasoning, however, preserved error of law.
The 1945 Constitution, in chapter IX, article 24, 24A, 24B, 24C and 25, stipulate the definition of judicial power in Indonesian legal system. Article 24 (1) defines:
(1) The judicial power shall be independent to organize judicial administration in order to uphold the law and justice.
Article 24 (2) declared that:
(2) The judicial power shall be exercised by a Supreme Court and its judiciary organs within the jurisdiction of public courts, religious court, military court, state administration court, and by a Constitutional Court.
The power of Constitutional Court, in the context of due process of law, is stipulated under article 24C (1), is read:
(1) The Constitutional Court shall have the authority to adjudicate at the first level and last resort of which the decision shall be final in examining the laws towards the Constitution, deciding disputes concerning state institutions authorities whose are provided by the Constitution, deciding on the dissolution of political parties, and deciding disputes concerning election result.
Pursuant to those provisions, in order to uphold the law and justice, judicial power is mandated not solely to the Supreme Court, but also to the Constitutional Court. It would be then questionable when the Court drawn its conclusion that due process of law depends merely on the Supreme Court and its lower proceedings. 
III. CONCLUDING REMARK
The determination to grant legal standing should be based on the constitutional loss of the applicant rather than on the subjected parties. The
Court's decision in determining non-Indonesian citizens' legal standing based on the expressis verbis of article 51 (1) (a) has abandoned the substance of that concerned article, the constitutional loss. This ruling, however, amounts to the error application of the 1945 Constitution and culminating to immune status of article 51 (1) from judicial review. The genuine mandate of the Court for reviewing the laws is then obscured by such determination.
As the judgment of Constitutional Court is final and not subjected for any review, there is nothing here to suggest available avenues in order to correct this ruling. In forthcoming examinations, perhaps, the judges' dissenting opinion in this case could be invoked to remind the Court for the ratio legis of judicial review.
